1.   Income Tax Officer, Vs. Smt. Rosamma Korah, ITA Nos. 646 & 663 (COCH.) of 2013, Date of Order: 07.03.2014, ITAT - COCHIN
			
			
			'Due date' mentioned u/s 54F is due date for filing return u/s 139(1)
			
			
			The Apex Court
			had an occasion to interpret the provisions of Income-tax Act in 
			Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT [2004] 266 ITR 1/135 Taxman 327 (SC), more 
			particularly, the term 'due date' and held that due date means the due 
			date for filing the return under section 139(2) and not section 139(4). 
			The Apex Court further found that had the intentions of the Legislature 
			was to permit the assessee to file the return u/s 139(4) also, the use 
			of the expression "section 139" alone would have been sufficed. The 
			Legislature would not have said that it should be filed u/s 139(1). When
			the Legislature specifically refers to section 139(1), it cannot be the
			intention to permit the assessee to file the return u/s 139(4) also. 
			The Supreme Court specifically observed that it cannot be said that the 
			Legislature without any purpose or intent specified only the 
			sub-sections (1) and (2) and the conspicuous omission of sub-section (4)
			has no meaning or purpose behind it. Sub-section (4) of section 139 
			cannot by any stretch of imagination control the operation of 
			sub-section (1) wherein a fixed period for furnishing the return is 
			stipulated. 
			
			
			(Please click here for judgment)
			
			
			 
			
			
			2.  Rajeev
			Kumar Agarwal Vs. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax  Range 3, ITA 
			No.: 337/Agra/2013, Date of Pronouncement: 29.05.2013, ITAT - Agra
			
			
			No 
			disallowance to be made us. 40(a)(ia) upon failure to deduct TDS on 
			payment if payee has offered amount to tax. Second proviso to s. 
			40(a)(ia) shall operate retrospectively since 01.04.2005
			
			
			
			The second 
			proviso to s. 40(a)(ia), introduced by the Finance Act 2013 w.e.f. 
			01.04.2013, read with s. 201, provides that despite failure to deduct 
			TDS, disallowance of the expenditure shall not be made if the resident 
			payee has (i) furnished his return of income u/s 139, (ii) taken into 
			account such sum for computing income in such ROI, (iii) paid the tax 
			due on the income declared by him in such return of income and (iv) 
			furnishes a certificate to this effect from an accountant in the 
			prescribed form. The scheme of s. 40(a)(ia) is aimed at ensuring that an
			expenditure should not be allowed as deduction in the hands of an 
			assessee in a situation in which income embedded in such expenditure has
			remained untaxed due to tax withholding lapses by the assessee. It is 
			not a penalty for tax withholding lapse but it is a sort of compensatory
			deduction restriction for an income going untaxed due to tax 
			withholding lapse. S. 40(a)(ia), as it existed prior to insertion of 
			second proviso thereto, went much beyond the obvious intentions of the 
			lawmakers and created undue hardships even in cases in which the 
			assessee’s tax withholding lapses did not result in any loss to the 
			exchequer. Now that the legislature has been compassionate enough to 
			cure these shortcomings of provision, and thus obviate the unintended 
			hardships, such an amendment in law, in view of the well settled legal 
			position to the effect that a curative amendment to avoid unintended 
			consequences is to be treated as retrospective in nature even though it 
			may not state so specifically, the insertion of second proviso must be 
			given retrospective effect from the point of time when the related legal
			provision was introduced. 
			
			
			
			(Please click here for judgment)